There is a growing literature revolving around the role of non-State actors in the international law-making process. The starting point of this article is that although informal international lawmaking may not be legally binding, it would be unwise to dismiss it as legally irrelevant. Informal law-making can be relevant with respect to conceptualising and applying existing law, as well as guiding future regulation. The present discussion is placed in the context of cyberspace and, more specifically, the Internet standardisation bodies" informal law-making functions when creating Internet protocols by setting Internet standards. The article addresses the legitimacy and the ongoing work of the Internet Advisory Board and Internet Engineering Task Force in setting Internet standards with the aim to protect Internet users from mass surveillance and serious threats to privacy online. The article makes two main arguments. First, the effective protection of online privacy cannot be understood only in terms of compliance with legal frameworks but-in practice -that also needs to be secured through technological means. Second, in the area of online privacy informal law-making and international law converge in a distinctive way. Internet standards should not necessarily be seen as "living a parallel life" to law or as displacing or merely complementing the law. Technical standards and international law can actively inform one another and converge in their application. The analysis explores the implications of the Internet"s technical features to policy-making and legal reasoning by discussing State and judicial practice. The article demonstrates how the technical perspective on privacy informs and enriches the manner in which the legal advisor argues about privacy, the legislator articulates the interests at stake and the judge and practitioner interpret and apply international human rights law.
Introduction
There is a growing literature revolving around the role of non-State actors in the international law-making process. The starting point of this article is that, although informal international lawmaking may not be legally binding, it would be unwise to dismiss it as legally irrelevant. Informal law-making can be relevant with respect to conceptualising and applying existing law as well as guiding future regulation. The present discussion is placed in the context of cyberspace and, more specifically, the Internet standardisation bodies" informal law-making functions when creating [3]
lawyers. This is not the first time that novel international bodies appear, at first, insignificant or irrelevant in the eyes of international lawyers.
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The article addresses in particular how the Internet standardisation bodies create informal lawmaking (Internet standards) with the aim to protect Internet users from mass surveillance and serious threats to privacy online. Recent revelations that States conduct mass and indiscriminate surveillance and eavesdrop on digital communications demonstrate that "governmental mass surveillance emerges as a dangerous habit rather than an exceptional measure". 3 The consequences of pervasive monitoring 4 cannot be duly appreciated unless one underlines that the exercise of the right to privacy is also a prerequisite for realizing other human rights -both online and offline 5 -and that serious and systematic attacks on online privacy further undermine relations among States, confidence of the citizens in the rule of law, and trust in the digital economy. 6 Despite the serious interests at stake, we are far from comprehending fully the ramifications of the violation and abuse of privacy by means of pervasive monitoring. Affirming that human rights apply equally offline and online is an invaluable and timely pronouncement, [ 4] implications of the Internet"s technical features to policy-making and legal reasoning. 8 The analysis and findings come to reinforce the point of the UN Special Rapporteur on Privacy with regard to fully exploring the potential of international law, including binding and non-binding instruments, with a view to protect privacy online. 9 The article makes two main arguments. First, it argues that the effective protection of online privacy cannot be understood only in terms of compliance with legal frameworks but that -in practice -it also needs to be secured through technological means. Second, the article argues that, in the area of online privacy, informal lawmaking and international law converge in a distinctive way. Technical (Internet) standards should not necessarily be seen as "living a parallel life" to law or as displacing or merely complementing the law. The article shows how technical standards and international law can actively inform one another and converge in their application.
The analysis is structured into three main parts. The first part introduces the informal law-making Privacy by Design is different from privacy-enhancing technologies in that the former is a general requirement of the core architecture of a system or product, whereas the latter are employed to strengthen privacy-related components of the system, as a second stage, when the architecture is already in place. The term "privacy by design" was coined by Dr Ann Cavoukian, former Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario, Canada. For a quick overview of different approaches see Ann Cavoukian, "Privacy by Design in Law, Policy and Practice -A White Paper for Regulators, Decision-makers and Policy-makers" (2011) 19-24, <http://privacybydesign.ca/content/uploads/2011/08/pbd-law-policy.pdf> accessed 1 May 2016.
[5]
the Internet"s basic architecture, 11 the creation of a privacy vocabulary and encrypting the web.
Interestingly, Internet standards are being informed by, and in turn shape and nurture, legal standards and business practices. The technical community employs legal definitions and texts in order to address the issue of the right to privacy. Conversely, its work on studying the implications of, and dangers posed by, mass surveillance not only assists in understanding the value of online privacy but also provides insights to much-debated legal questions, such as whether metadata fall within the protective scope of privacy, what constitutes an interference with privacy and how we legally conceptualise privacy harms in the online environment. Finally, the third part proceeds to explore how the technical perspective on privacy can inform the manner in which the legal advisor argues about privacy, the legislator articulates the interests at stake and the academic and practitioner interpret international human rights law. The relevance of the location and nationality of individuals in the digital environment and the interrelation of privacy and freedom of expression are questions that require us to revisit our take on interpreting and applying international human rights law to privacy online.
Internet Standards as Informal Law-making
Internet governance is highly fragmented in terms of the distribution of authority, reflecting the decentralised nature of the Internet itself. The creation and evolution of the Internet are shaped by standards, principles, norms, rules and business practices, which are developed in a multistakeholder ecosystem. States, the technical community, industry, civil society, academia and global users participate to varying degrees in formal and informal governance arrangements.
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Despite this fragmentation and the absence of formal authority, a limited de facto hierarchy exists in the day-to-day management of the Internet. 13 The Internet"s engineers and, in particular, the IETF and the IAB, are responsible for managing the technical aspects of the Internet. The IETF"s goal is "to make the Internet work better" 14 and its mission is to identify and suggest solutions to technical problems. [6]
engineering development of the Internet. 15 These two bodies are the most important global standard-setters in the field and, therefore, their privacy-related work merits careful study. 16 This section explains the function of the Internet protocols and proceeds to address the protocols" value as informal law-making. The discussion also assesses the legitimacy of the standards and the standard-setting process.
The Function and Normative Value of Internet Standards
Internet protocols constitute the backbone of the Internet upon which all the layers of the network are created. 17 As such, they define -to a significant extent -how the Internet functions, and they frame the context of its legal regulation. 18 The core architecture of the Internet is a strong mode of regulation itself: technological capabilities and design choices impose rules/constraints on the online user regarding access and use of information. 19 The default settings -from the design of the Internet protocols to a particular application or browser -shape the user"s choices.
Consequently, Internet protocols are a "hidden" yet powerful regulatory force complementing the law, the market and the social norms developed online.
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An (international) lawyer may perhaps struggle to identify the normative value of these protocols. The Internet standard-setting process does not observe formalities traditionally associated with the production of domestic or international law in terms of the processes followed, the actors involved or the final output. 23 This informality, however, does not necessarily mean that these bodies and the respective standardisation process lack legitimacy. 24 On the contrary, there is strong evidence to suggest that the IETF meets high standards of transparency and inclusiveness.
A. Stakeholder Participation and Involvement in the Standard-setting Process
The establishment of the Internet"s standardisation bodies is informal. The IETF emerged from a quasi-academic group of people who created the Internet. It was established as a body in 1986 and today it is still organised as an activity of the Internet Society (ISOC) -a US non-profit entity. The IAB, the members of which are selected from and by the IETF participants, is chartered both as a committee of the IETF and as an advisory body of ISOC. 25 The IETF is financially independent, funding its operations from conference fees and ISOC"s membership fees. 26 Its informality extends also to the internal structure of the two bodies. [9]
Technology (CDT) 33 is one such public-interest advocacy group actively participating in the IETF.
Turning to the quality of stakeholders" participation in the decision-making process, this is an issue that can be assessed only empirically. To give an example, the IETF"s working culture consists of creative, highly opinionated scientists who debate over their ideas and proposals. This has led to the nurturing of a confrontational environment in which all parties must argue strongly for their positions in order to be heard and to persuade others. Yet many people find such an environment to be rather inaccessible, or even professionally inappropriate, especially if they come from an entirely different cultural background (e.g. Asia). 34 The IETF community seems to have acknowledged the matter and steps are being taken toward promoting greater diversity and establishing norms of professional conduct.
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B. Setting the Standards and Navigating the "Tussles"
In day-to-day work, technical standards are developed by working groups, which are set up to address specific operational and technical problems. The groups publish technical standards as well as other deliverables, such as guidelines or current best practice. 36 The standard-setting process is stipulated by a detailed set of procedural rules, which includes an appeal mechanism.
Each new proposal for a specification is initially published as a "Request for Comment" (RFC)
and it undergoes a period of review and revision, reflecting the strongly collaborative nature of the standards" development. 37 The proposed standard is a draft under discussion until (if) it reaches a certain level of maturity and becomes an Internet standard. 38 There are no formal voting rules and new standards are approved by "rough consensus and running code", which means that the value of the ideas is assessed by the empirical evidence for their feasibility and the combined 33 The Centre is a US-based, non-profit organisation, which aims to preserve the user- Reducing the Standards Track to Two Maturity Levels (n 37) 2.
[10] Despite the fact that the creation of Internet standards seems to demonstrate a high level of legitimacy, the present discussion raises the question of whether broader, societal concerns can be taken into account when drafting a standard. 47 It is clear that for a specification to be adopted it needs to be of the highest technical quality and it must be supported by widespread consensus. In addition to these criteria, the standardisation process indicates that a third requirement should be met: the IETF needs to make an assessment of the interests of all affected parties as well as the specification"s contribution to the Internet. 48 Consequently, the standard-setting process is, in principle, receptive to external concerns. Does this mean, however, that the IETF will 
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The Internet Standards Process -Revision 3 (n 21) 2-3.
[11]
acknowledge and consider other values and interests outside its technical mandate? For instance, will the IETF take freedom of expression or the privacy of the end users into account? The answer seems to be in the negative.
A careful reading of the IETF"s mandate suggests that it must assess how a specification affects the interests of all relevant parties. The IETF will not take privacy into account as a value in itself, but instead will consider how an Internet protocol (or the absence thereof) impacts users"
expectations of privacy and, therefore, their trust in the network. This point is further illustrated by an Internet-Draft that is currently being discussed in the IETF community. The "representing stakeholder rights in Internet protocols" draft was a response to the mass surveillance revelations and it is an attempt to explore how the IETF encompasses stakeholder rights in Internet protocols and how it should address ethical, societal and legal judgments in protocol design. 49 Yet the draft was dropped and, almost a year later, a new draft was submitted to discussion ("The Internet is for
End Users"). The new draft frames the main issues in an entirely different way; it focuses on identifying the different constituencies within the Internet community and evaluating the impact of Internet standards on those constituencies" interests. This removes from the equation any discussion of stakeholder rights/interests or of making societal/legal judgments when designing technology: the question rather revolves around the assessment of the impact of technology on the users" interests. In this way, the IETF remains committed to its technical mandate while still considering non-technical issues in the standard-setting process, albeit in a narrow framework.
The Internet-Draft aims to set guidelines for computer engineers on how to identify different sub communities within the Internet community and how to assess the impact of Internet standards on them in a more systematic and open fashion. 50 The draft also stresses that end users should take priority over other sub communities (e.g. network operators, equipment vendors, service providers), even though sometimes a protocol design decision will need to strike a balance between the benefits to two or more sub communities. In such a case, any trade-offs must be documented and justified. If this Internet-Draft matures into an Internet standard, it will both enhance the clarity of the decision-making process (input legitimacy) and aid external parties when engaging with the results of the standards process (output legitimacy). 51 In a similar vein, Pauwelyn, Wessel, Wouters (n 24) 90-91; Peters and Peter (n 2) 195.
[13]
not necessarily have negative connotations. "The geeks will save the Internet and privacy" is a prevalent narrative among Internet users. 59 This strong social legitimacy seems to do justice to the values that this transnational community serves, and to its readiness to protect these values against external interference. One should recall that, when in 1992 the IETF participants thought that there was an attempt to interfere politically with its technical work and to establish internal hierarchies within the community, they declared that "We reject: kings, presidents and voting. We believe in: rough consensus and working code". 60 The Internet"s technical community is, or at least is perceived to be, the legitimate guardian of the network and the values it carries within it.
3. Creating Informal Law-making for Protecting Privacy Online
Appreciating Online Privacy as a Technical Issue
Even though privacy has always been a peripheral issue in the work of the IETF and IAB, the recent disclosures on mass surveillance by States 61 have forced the engineering community to face one of their major concerns, namely, the need to avoid exceeding their technical mandates or getting involved in politics. This section argues that the protection of online privacy falls within the remit of the standardisation bodies" work. The IETF and IAB have, in fact, decided to defend the network against (mass) surveillance. The IETF, however, does not value privacy as a human right per se or as a legal consideration; privacy is an instrumental value and it is viewed as a necessary condition for restoring and maintaining users" trust in the Internet.
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It needs to be clarified from the outset that the work of the IETF, although technical, is not neutral or value-free. 63 Since Internet protocols are a form of regulation by default, standardisation bodies also make choices by default. 64 Furthermore, the IETF"s mission statement clearly States that "the Internet isn"t value-free and neither is the IETF". 65 The IETF chooses to create certain technology by embracing specific technical concepts and ideas (decentralized control, edge-user [14]
empowerment and sharing resources). 66 The IAB, for its part, is entrusted with protecting the reliable operation of the Internet and the free flow of information, which is a broadly defined responsibility.
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The mandate of these bodies is not static: as the function and scope of the Internet evolves, so too will the role of the expert bodies entrusted with a public policy role in Internet governance.
Protocol designers are more than familiar with the evolutionary nature of the Internet. In their view, the only principle of the Internet that will survive indefinitely is the principle of constant change: the architectural structure of the Internet is aimed at providing a set of rules (protocols)
that generates a continuously evolving space of technology. 68 This is clear both in how the Internet is envisioned and how Internet standards develop. 69 Therefore, although these bodies are bound by their technical mandates, these mandates have to be read in the light of the needs of the users in whose name they act. 70 The protection of users" privacy is a serious and legitimate concern when designing and updating protocols. As discussed earlier, the affected parties" interests 71 and the specification"s contribution to the Internet"s evolution are requirements to be addressed in the standardisation process. Due to the unique features of the Internet"s architecture, any threats to users" privacy, equally qualify as threats to the fundamental value of the network: trust among its users. The core architecture of the network is its end-to-end design; this design, however, is based upon the presumption of trust. 79 Threats and risks to privacy, and especially pervasive monitoring, directly impact the level of trust placed by users in the network: compromising users" privacy undermines the network because the network is its end users. According to the engineering community"s mindset, pervasive monitoring is an attack because users" participation in the network is adversely affected, the free flow of information is inhibited and the integrity and confidentiality of information are endangered. Threats to users" privacy undermine the reliable operation and the responsible use of the network as a whole.
The Technical "Solution" to Serious Threats to Privacy Online and its
Relevance to International Human Rights Law [16]
The technical "solution" to serious threats to privacy online comprises of integrating Privacy by Design requirements into the Internet protocols. The first section discusses two specific threads of the IETF"s ongoing standardisation work, namely, the introduction of a privacy vocabulary and encrypting the Web. The analysis shows that informal law-making in this area is relevant to business practices and legal regulation. The technical community takes into consideration and, in turn, informs legal aspects of, the right to privacy. In this sense, Internet standards can nurture and shape privacy-protection practices in business practices, 80 and they have the potential to guide future regulation. 81 At the same time, however, the protection embedded in the technology of the Internet standards is subject to any restrictions imposed by States. Similarly, the extent to which
Privacy by Design features in the Internet protocols will impact end users depends on whether other stakeholders in the Internet"s ecosystem, such as service providers, implement these protocols in all layers of the network.
A. Integrating Privacy by Design into Internet Protocols
Privacy by Design affects the way the Internet is designed as well as the IETF"s philosophy. The foundational end-to-end design principle encapsulates the choice made in the early development of the Internet to leave security and privacy issues to be addressed by the end users. This choice served the purpose of keeping the core communication Internet protocols as simple as possible.
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It is for this reason that the Internet"s engineers did not deem privacy to be a requirement when designing the Internet but rather something to be addressed by the end users. 83 This essential design principle, however, rests upon the fact that the Internet was originally built by a community of like-minded professionals who trusted each other. 84 In light of the unprecedented expansion of the Internet, and the recent revelations about state surveillance, the IETF reexamined its decision to leave privacy and security issues to the end users. In this sense, the integration of privacy requirements into the Internet standards signifies a rearrangement of the IETF"s standardisation philosophy and it indicates that privacy will be considered prior to 80 Privacy Considerations for Internet Protocols (n 72). [17]
designing new protocols or updating existing ones. 85 The consequence of shifting from the approach of leaving privacy to the end user to introducing Privacy by Design into the Internet protocols is that the core architecture of the Internet will encapsulate a higher level of privacyprotection features on a global level. This level of protection ensures stronger privacy protection than the (additional) measures taken by the individual user. The global interoperability of the network also ensures that privacy protection is ensured regardless of national borders, thereby mitigating threats to privacy and weakening the technical feasibility of conducting mass surveillance.
i. Developing a Privacy Vocabulary
In 2012 the IAB issued a report proposing, for the first time, a privacy-threat model with a specific focus on pervasive monitoring. 86 The model addresses the question of how surveillance can be countered on a technical level. 87 The IAB also established a privacy directorate to ensure that privacy considerations are considered and incorporated accordingly when drafting Internet standards. 88 This is an example of how the bodies" remain vigilant with regard to shaping their working culture and adapting their internal organisational structure. Furthermore, a notable contribution of this model is the creation of a privacy vocabulary, which defines privacy threats and establishes relevant terminology. 89 The main aim of this vocabulary is to introduce privacyrelated concepts to the engineering community. Protocol designers need to be aware of specific engineering choices that can impact on privacy when crafting standards. 90 Just as the legal community is struggling to comprehend the technical aspects of privacy, the technical community is also in the process of realising the value of privacy as a consideration in its work.
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What is particularly interesting about the development of a privacy vocabulary is its interrelation with privacy from a legal point of view. On the one hand, the technical community uses legal standards to inform its guidelines. The IETF not only documents the technical means employed to conduct mass surveillance, but also draws upon existing legal and policy privacy frameworks, [18]
such as texts by the Council of Europe, the Fair Information Practices, and the OECD guidelines concerning the collection and use of personal data and the Privacy by Design concept. 92 On the other hand, the technical community"s work makes a relevant contribution to the legal community regarding the conceptualisation of privacy in cases of (mass) surveillance. 93 A user-centric approach to privacy risks focuses on the ways in which end users feel threatened or suffer harm.
The different types of privacy harm, including harm to financial standing, reputation, autonomy, and safety, are discussed at length. 94 The IETF notes that "when individuals or their activities are monitored, exposed, or at risk of exposure, those individuals may be stifled from expressing themselves, associating with others, and generally conducting their lives freely. They may also feel a general sense of unease". Ibid.
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Ibid, 13 (emphasis added). [20]
applicants" communications, and consequently that there was no actual or imminent injury (no injury-in-fact).
ii. Creating an Encrypted Web
The IETF is currently focusing on security and encryption as one of the means to mitigate privacy threats.107 The Internet"s engineers classify online surveillance as a combined security and privacy threat, underpinning the fact that security and privacy are interrelated. 108 In November 2014, the IAB issued a Statement on Internet Confidentiality in which it reaffirmed that the growth of the Internet depends on users having confidence that their private information is protected in the network. 109 The IAB underscored the importance that protocol designers, developers and operators should make encryption the norm for Internet traffic. The on-going standardisation work on "opportunistic security" is aimed at ensuring some security, even when full end-to-end security is not possible. 110 A few new working groups have been set up, focusing on areas within the Internet protocols that have been neglected from a privacy point of view, such as Internet traffic and metadata. The working group on using transport layer security (TLS) in applications was established to increase the security of transmissions over the Internet, including email communications. 111 The Group has identified best practices in using TLS and unauthenticated encryption in future application definitions. 112 Further, the working group on domain name system privacy considerations is developing a private exchange mechanism so that 106
Ibid; cf Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Ginsburg, Justice Sotomayor, and Justice Kagan join, dissenting, 6.
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The IETF"s work to mitigate privacy threats revolves around 1) data minimisation; 2) user participation and empowerment; and 3) security. These three areas can be loosely mapped to existing privacy principles, such as the Fair Information Practices, but they have been adapted to the aims and mindset of the engineers. See Privacy Considerations for Internet Protocols (n 72) 18.
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The IAB created the Security and Privacy Program in May 2014 by merging two separate programmes on security and privacy respectively. Pervasive Monitoring is an Attack (n 4) 3; Privacy Considerations for Internet Protocols (n 72) 13. [21]
DNS transactions and queries become more private. [22]
B. Privacy by Design Subject to Law and Business Practices
Privacy by Design as a technological/informal law-making standard embedded into Internet protocols is yet subject to law as well as business practices. To be accurate, it is the precise impact of the Internet standards to the Internet user"s privacy that depends on how the Privacy by
Design is implemented into all layers of the network. The IETF has thus far focused mostly on the design and update of core (low-layer) Internet protocols since it is difficult for protocol designers to foresee all pertinent privacy risks when browsers and web services implement [23]
-must be designed to prevent privacy harm to individuals. 124 In a similar vein to the new EU Regulation, the principle affords no specific rights to individuals and no concrete obligations are imposed on data controllers. 125 It remains, therefore, to be seen how these principles will be [25]
progress, which could be a positive indicator of subjecting possible changes to debate. The US after many "backs and forths" decided (for now) that it will not regulate encryption; the Indian government withdrew a draft encryption policy after public uproar over the proposed measures; 138 and France seems to have abandoned its plans on banning Tor and other anonymity mechanisms. 139 Encryption in communications is unlikely to be banned. Similarly, suggestions to build "backdoors" into systems or purposeful weaknesses that can be exploited to gain access have been officially dropped, although informal discussions with the private sector are on the table regarding granting access to unencrypted data or undermining data security and privacy.
Most States, including China, France, the UK and the US, opt out for the "moderate" position of introducing targeted decryption orders.
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From a human rights law point of view, restrictions to encryption and anonymity as enablers of the right to privacy and freedom of expression must meet the well-known human rights three-part test: any limitations need to be provided by law, serve a legitimate aim and conform to the necessity and proportionality requirements. 141 Moreover, when States request disclosure of encrypted information procedural and judicial safeguards should be in place, including a judicial warrant. There is also merit in the argument that States have the positive obligation under the right to freedom of expression and the right to privacy to actively promote and facilitate security of online communications. 142 If such an obligation is read into the scope of these rights, the scrutiny of States" regulation of encryption and anonymity could be raised to a higher standard.
Overall, the relevance of the international human rights law framework is noteworthy so that a clear point of reference is provided for policy-makers and judges on a universal level. Relying solely upon domestic law guarantees ignores the existing international safeguards and hinders their progressive development. Threats to privacy online are not anymore a matter to be framed Report on "Encryption -A Matter of Human Rights", (n 135) 37.
[26]
and discussed in terms of (western) democratic and non-democratic States, as it is being presented. 143 Such distinctions are informative but they do not accurately reflect state practice and, therefore, they are meaningful to a certain extent.
To sum up, from a technical point of view, privacy protection is no longer a mere concern, but is now a guiding, structural principle of protocol design embedded into the DNA of the Internet and further disseminated to the deployment of Internet protocols. Privacy protection has become a thread running through the fundamental fabric of the Internet tapestry. 144 Following IETF"s emphatic 2014 statement describing pervasive monitoring as an attack, and having demonstrated in this paper the rigorous and systematic technical work in progress, it is reasonable to expect that the efforts to support Privacy by Design in the Internet standards will be further intensified. 145 Internet standardisation is not, however, watertight and compartmentalised from legal and regulatory developments. The development of Internet standards toward protecting privacy online and enhancing security of communications is in a symbiotic relationship with international human rights law and business practices. 146 This also involves that Privacy by Design entrenched into the
Internet"s technology and its impact to the Internet user is conditioned to how States will regulate
Privacy by Design in law and how they will receive encryption and anonymity online.
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second, the application of international human rights law to the digital environment. A series of recent developments in the United Nations has formally acknowledged that human rights apply online. The UN General Assembly, in its 2014 Resolution, affirmed for the first time that the right to privacy applies in digital communications and called upon States to respect their associated obligations. 149 Similarly, the UN Human Rights Council has confirmed that the same rights that people enjoy offline must also be protected online, and has stressed that all States must address security concerns on the Internet in accordance with their human rights obligations.
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The Human Rights Council also established the mandate for the UN Special Rapporteur on Privacy. 151 Turning to the application of the right to privacy online, the OHCHR, the UN Special [30]
freedom of expression. 160 The UN Rapporteur on Privacy has already underlined the critical role of privacy online both as complementary to security and as an enabling right to other human rights.
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International and domestic bodies and courts should explore how this perspective informs legal reasoning in two respects. First, the strong interconnection between privacy and freedom of expression can be taken into account when freedom of expression is assessed as a proportionate and necessary restriction to the right to privacy, and vice versa. This is all the more the case since certain international courts -for instance, the ECtHR -seem to be predisposed toward protecting the right to privacy to the expense of acknowledging modern pronouncements of freedom of expression online (eg, re-use of or turning data and databases to readable and searchable formats). 162 It would be also interesting to see how the ECtHR, in the Bureau of Investigative Journalism and the 10 Human Rights Organisations cases, will discuss the allegation that the generic surveillance conducted by GCHQ violated both the right to privacy and freedom of expression and whether it will read the interests in accordance with international legal and technical developments. 163 Second, domestic and international courts need to acknowledge and "translate" in legal and human rights law terms the symbiotic relationship between security, on the one hand, and privacy and freedom of expression on the other hand. Privacy and security can be mutually supportive goals and, therefore, courts need to appreciate their interrelation in a non-conflictual fashion.
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Security measures that aim to strengthen the protection of privacy should be carefully assessed.
Weakening encryption, for example, will have serious ramifications not only to undermining the effective exercise of the right to privacy and freedom of expression 165 The oral amendment was voted down by twenty-eight to fifteen votes. The states that voted in favour of the amendment were: Algeria, China, Congo, Cuba, Namibia, Russia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, human rights angle puts pressure on States regarding the protection of online privacy, it also brings considerations which are invoked to place limitations on the effective exercise of privacy rights and which are usually construed very broadly. In this way, legal regulation may undermine the interoperability of the Internet. 173 At the other end of the spectrum, the technical approach to privacy lays the basis for a less heated cultural debate and promotes a language that certain States would perhaps be more willing to accept. The technical perspective highlights the significance of users" privacy to the development of the digital economy. The growth of the Internet depends on users having confidence that their private information is secure and, consequently, privacy online is not only a human right, but also an enabler of public trust in the network. 174 Such a strategy can be persuasive when addressing policy-makers from specific regions of the world as well as when motivating all law-makers to enhance legal and technical privacy safeguards. 175 The International Conference of Data Protection, Privacy Commissioners and the European Data Protection Authorities as well as the APEC leaders have acknowledged the importance of safeguarding the integrity of the network as a value in itself. 176 There is, however, merit in arguing that the technical approach to privacy deprives the discussion of its socio-political dimensions. 177 It cannot go unnoticed that the human rights approach to cyberspace does not only refer to strictly speaking the applicability and
application of human rights online but also introduces a "humanisation" narrative of the Internet. [34]
courts and other bodies, and given great weight by judges and policy-makers respectively. The work of Article 19, an international NGO dedicated to the protection of freedom of expression, is noteworthy. Article 19, in its oral statement to the Human Rights Council Panel Discussion on Privacy, argued for the human right to online privacy by adopting the technical community"s own mind-set; it States that:
"[w]here privacy online is threatened, trust in the Internet evaporates. Pervasive, untargeted and unchecked surveillance, including the interception, collection or retention of communications or meta-data, is a systemic and structural attack on the Internet, regardless of the nationality or location of the "target" ". Conversely, a state cannot extend its jurisdiction outside its national borders by way of circumventing privacy protection. The US Supreme Court has recently approved a rule change that could allow law enforcement to remotely search computers around the world. 185 Under the proposed change the government would be able to obtain a single warrant to access and searchessentially hack -any number of computers simultaneously regardless of their location or whether the users are a threat to national security or suspected of any crime. 186 Such a practice not only subverts legal safeguards of privacy in both in the US and in third States but also compromises the functioning of the network. It is difficult to anticipate how the unpredictable nature of government malware to infiltrate user devices will perform in the real world. Government hacking also broadly undermines the security of the global Internet. 187 Similar suggestions for government hacking are being explored in the United Kingdom 188 and the Netherlands. 189 The execution of a US warrant to hand over a customer"s email stored in a data centre in Ireland is also an attempt to evade human rights law safeguards in the territory of another state by putting pressure on a corporation (Microsoft). 190 It is true that data does not follow the predictable paths of the physical world and that the law and law enforcement need to keep up with the evolution of technology. The legal means to do so, however, need to serve transparency and respect
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[36]
international and national standards of online privacy. The use of means of transnational cooperation, such as Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties, is a preferable way of thinking the way forward in such instances.
Conclusions
The legal nature and effects of informal law-making are context-specific and should be assessed on a case-by-case basis, given the plurality of informal norms that may be taken into consideration. There is no doubt that Internet standards, set by the IETF and IAB, are not legally binding, nor do they have the potential to evolve into something binding. Internet standards, nonetheless, frame, and to a great extent shape, the user"s choices online and therefore constitute a powerful regulatory force.
Even though the Internet standards-setting process does not observe traditional law-making formalities, there is strong evidence to suggest that the IETF meets high standards of transparency, inclusiveness and legitimacy. There is, however, scope for engaging a broader spectrum of stakeholders in the standardisation process, and for promoting greater diversity Building upon these findings, the discussion turned to examine the computer engineers" approach to privacy online. The IETF has declared in the most emphatic terms that mass surveillance and serious threats to users" privacy are an attack on the reliable operation of the network. In this context, privacy online has an instrumental value as a necessary condition for retaining trust in the network. The IETF decided to become a guardian of privacy online, and to integrate Privacy by Design into the core Internet architecture as a requirement when creating and updating [37] standards. This has a series of implications for the IETF"s design philosophy, its organisational structure and the level of privacy protection contained within technology and afforded to global end users. It was argued that the technical discussion of many aspects of privacy interacts in manifold ways with the legal and human rights approaches to privacy: they enhance each other"s understanding of the specificities of the online environment and they converge in their understanding of the meaning of interference in cases of mass surveillance. Moreover, Internet standards operationalize a given level of privacy protection. At the same time, the precise impact of Privacy by Design incorporated into protocols for the benefit of the end user is dependent on the practices of service providers on the application layer of the network and on state legislation.
Crucially, the technical community"s approach to privacy is an opportunity for international lawyers to rethink how we articulate, and argue for, privacy online from the point of view of international human rights law. For instance, the distinctive interconnection between privacy and freedom of information/expression online, or the relevance of the users" location and nationality, are issues that we need to reconsider in legal reasoning and in balancing the relevant interests.
